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I. INTRODUCTION
Whose woods these are I think I know.
His house is in the village though;
He will not see me stopping here
To watch his woods fill up with snow.
My little horse must think it queer
To stop without a farmhouse near
Between the woods and frozen lake
The darkest evening of the year.
He gives his harness bells a shake
To ask if there is some mistake.
The only other sound’s the sweep
Of easy wind and downy flake.
The woods are lovely, dark and deep.
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep.1
What would have happened if the horseman, instead of keeping his promises, had
decided to stay in the woods? Perhaps the story would have gone as follows. First
he built a fire to warm up. He then went ice fishing on the frozen lake, cooked his
fish on his fire, and took a nap. Eventually, he built a cabin and collected firewood
for the cold nights. He also found some oats nearby, so he was able to feed his horse
during the long winter.
As the lake began to thaw and leaves began to adorn the naked trees, the
horseman realized how truly magnificent really were the woods. He knew he could
never leave. So, he stayed through the spring and summer and, as autumn gave way
to winter, he was reminded of what drew him to these woods in the first place, the
serenity of the woods in winter.
And the cycle continued the next year, and the year after that. Eventually, the
horseman grew old; he had been in the woods for close to fifty years. No one had
missed him other than one nephew who owned a lumber company and who
occasionally visited him and made sure he was alive. Realizing that his health was
failing, the horseman wrote a will, in which he bequeathed his horse and his woods
to his dear nephew. A short time later, the horseman died. On his next trip to the see
his old uncle, the nephew found the horseman resting peacefully on a tree stump, his
body slumped on the remains of a tree he had cut down to build his cabin.
By this time, the true owner’s children had buried their father. When they read
his will, they learned that he had left them the entire forest. To their utter

1
Robert
Frost,
Stopping
by
the
Woods
on
a
Snowy
Evening,
http://www.mit.edu/people/dpolicar/writing/poetry/poems/stoppingByTheWoods.html
(last
visited Feb. 4, 2004).
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astonishment, when they came to survey their inheritance, they observed the
horseman’s nephew bringing in bulldozers.
But how should the story end? Who should be entitled to keep the property?
How should this dispute be resolved? Under the American law of adverse
possession, the horseman’s nephew will likely be rewarded for his uncle’s decision
to remain in the forest. Rather than keeping his promises and traveling all those
miles before he slept, the horseman instead acquired property that he was able to
leave to his nephew.
This article questions the current doctrine of adverse possession, which would
deprive the true owner’s children of their inheritance in favor of the horseman’s
nephew.2 Today, all states recognize that when a possessor satisfies the elements of
adverse possession, he assumes ownership of the property.3 Currently, adverse
possession serves as a mechanism through which property ownership magically
transfers from the true owner to the adverse possessor.4 By simply satisfying the
elements of adverse possession, the possessor becomes the owner of the property in
place of the true owner.5
Rather than viewing adverse possession as a method of acquiring land, adverse
possession should instead create a rebuttable presumption of ownership. The idea
that adverse possession should create a rebuttable presumption stems from the Judaic
law doctrine of chazakah.6 To explain why chazakah is preferable to the current
adverse possession doctrine, this article explains what chazakah is, addresses the
major justifications and criticisms of adverse possession, and proposes a shift in
adverse possession that would resemble chazakah. Adopting a method similar to
chazakah would protect the integrity of adverse possession’s justifications while
alleviating its strongest criticisms.
Section II of this article describes adverse possession and outlines its elements.
Not all states recognize the same elements for adverse possession, but a number of
elements are common to all states.7 This section, in describing how the doctrine
2

This article considers only adverse possession’s application to real property, not to
personal property. For a discussion of how adverse possession applies to personal property,
see Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 119
(1989). See also O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872 (N.J. 1980) (holding that in cases of
personal property, a discovery rule should replace adverse possession; “the inquiry will no
longer be whether the possessor has met the tests of adverse possession, but whether the owner
has acted with due diligence in pursuing his or her personal property.”).
3

Thomas J. Miceli, An Economic Theory of Adverse Possession, 15 INT’L REV. L. ECON.
161 (1995).
4
Throughout this article, chazakah will be addressed as a type of adverse possession.
Therefore, whether discussing adverse possession or chazakah, the “adverse possessor” is the
person attempting to acquire the property, and the true owner is the titleholder, the party
seeking to retain ownership, rather than lose his property to the adverse possessor.
5
See Lawrence v. Town of Concord, 788 N.E.2d 546, 551 (Mass. 2003) (holding that
meeting the elements of adverse possession confers title on the adverse possessor).
6

Bava Basra 3:1 (Mishnah).

7

For example, all states agree that the adverse possessor must display actual possession
and that his possession must be hostile to the true owner’s claim of ownership. See, e.g.,
Rutland v. Mullen, 798 A.2d 1104, 1110 (Me. 2002) (requiring actual and hostile possession
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works, provides a framework for discussing how and why the law should change.
Though the adverse possessor must meet a high burden to successfully assume
ownership in property, once he has met that burden, he becomes the owner.8 His
ownership rests completely on his own actions, not at all on the actions of the true
owner.9 To obtain ownership, the adverse possessor is not required to pay the true
owner for the land or even to claim that he ever did pay for the property. Simply
satisfying adverse possession’s elements confers ownership on the adverse
possessor.10
Section III of this article describes chazakah. This section explains what
chazakah is and more importantly what it is not. Unlike adverse possession,
chazakah serves not as a tool by which a person acquires land, but instead creates a
presumption of ownership.11
The true owner, however, may rebut that
presumption.12 Chazakah evidences a transaction and nothing more. It is not, by
itself, a method of obtaining ownership in property. Simply proving the elements of
chazakah will not result in ownership vesting in the adverse possessor.13
A close look at chazakah indicates that while chazakah and adverse possession
share a number of similarities, there is a fundamental difference between them. That
difference underscores two entirely different mechanisms for land transfer. Section
III concludes with an illustration of the difference between the doctrines by applying
the facts from Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom,14 to both adverse possession and chazakah.
Sections IV and V respectively discuss the major justifications for and criticisms
of adverse possession. Section VI explains how chazakah not only satisfies adverse
possession’s justifications but also escapes its criticisms, and explains why it is
therefore a suitable alternative to adverse possession.

as elements of adverse possession); Vezey v. Green, 35 P.3d 14, 20 (Alaska 2001) (including
actual and hostile possession as elements of adverse possession); City of Deadwood v.
Summit, Inc., 607 N.W.2d 22, 27 (S.D. 2000) (“The traditional elements of adverse possession
require the ‘actual . . . and hostile’ occupation of the property for the statutory period.”);
Kimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 303, 305 (Wyo. 1999) (“To establish adverse possession, the
claiming party must show actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of
another’s property which is hostile and under claim of right or color of title.”); Rice v.
McGinnis, 653 So.2d 950 (Ala. 1995) (requiring actual and hostile possession as elements of
adverse possession).
8
The high burden the adverse possessor faces manifests itself in the number of elements he
must prove and, in most states, the burden of proof with which he must prove them.
9

The adverse possessor’s ownership does, however, rely on the true owner’s failure to act.

10

See Gruebele v. Geringer, 640 N.W.2d 454, 457 (N.D. 2002) (noting that failure to meet
any element of adverse possession results in the title not being conferred; by implication,
meeting all the elements of adverse possession results in title being conferred).
11

See Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah).

12

See id.

13

Id.

14

799 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1990).
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II. ADVERSE POSSESSION
A. Elements: Generally
To acquire land through adverse possession, a possessor must prove a minimum
of five elements, though some states require additional elements as part of an adverse
possession claim.15 The basic elements are described as follows:
First, the possession must be actual. There must be physical control and
use of the disputed property for the statutory period. Second, the
possession of the disputed tract must be hostile to other competing claims
to the property. Third, that possession must be open and notorious, such
that those individuals having competing claims to the property actually
know or should have known of that possession. Fourth, possession must
be exclusive, such that others with competing claims to the property are
wholly excluded from the property. Lastly, the possession must be
continuous . . . .16
B. Additional Elements
Some states require adverse possessors to prove elements in addition to the five
listed above. These other elements include the adverse possessor paying property
taxes on the land,17 possessing the land “under color of title,”18 and occupying the
15
Compare Belotti v. Bickhardt, 127 N.E. 239, 241 (N.Y. 1920) (requiring only the basic
five elements to prove an adverse possession claim), with Bradley v. Demos, 599 So.2d 1148,
1149 (Ala. 1992) (requiring, in a case of statutory adverse possession, “that the [adverse]
possessor hold [the property] under color of title, have paid taxes on the property for ten years,
or have derived his title by descent or devise” and hold the property under claim of right, in
addition to “the common elements of actual, exclusive, open, notorious, and hostile
possession”).
16

Rodgers v. Thelkald, 80 S.W.3d 532, 534-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (emphases added)
(citations omitted). See also Lewis v. Aslesen, 635 N.W.2d 744, 746 (S.D. 2001) (holding
that parties “claiming ownership to land through adverse possession must show that their
possession was actual, open, visible, notorious, continuous, and hostile”); Hoffman v.
Freeman Land & Timber, LLC, 994 P.2d 106, 109 (Or. 1999) (holding that a successful
adverse possession claim requires the purported adverse possessor to establish that the use of
the property was actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and hostile); Grace v. Koch,
692 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (Ohio 1998) (adopting only the basic five elements as the test for
adverse possession, noting specifically that “to acquire title by adverse possession, a party
must prove . . . exclusive possession and open, notorious, continuous, and adverse use . . . .”).
17
See Unger v. Mooney, 63 Cal. 586, 595 (1883) (requiring the payment of taxes as an
element of adverse possession). See also Tidwell v. Strickler, 457 So.2d 365, 368 (Ala. 1984)
(holding that for statutory adverse possession, as opposed to adverse possession by
prescription, an adverse possessor must have paid taxes for at least ten years to successfully
litigate the claim); McKinnon v. Commerford, 88 So.2d 753 at 755 (Fla. 1956) (requiring, for
all adverse possession claims that ripened after 1939, adverse possessors to have paid taxes
from within one year after entry onto the disputed property to satisfy the elements of adverse
possession).
18
See, e.g., Sparks v. Douglas & Sparks Realty Co., 166 P. 285, 286 (Ariz. 1917)
(recognizing color of title as an element of adverse possession). See also Peters v. Smuggler-
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land in “good faith”19 or “under a claim of right.”20 These additional elements make
acquiring land through adverse possession more difficult; they do not, however,
change the nature of the doctrine. In addition to the elements, every state has
adopted a statute of limitations for adverse possession. These vary from state to
state, but range from five21 to thirty years for typical cases of adverse possession.22
C. Burden of Proof
Though the general rule for the burden of proof in civil cases is proof by a
preponderance of evidence,23 most states have adopted a more stringent rule in
adverse possession cases.24 In Grace v. Koch, for example, the Ohio Supreme Court
accepted the clear and convincing evidence standard as the burden of proof on the
adverse possessor.25 The higher standard allocates the risk of mistakenly depriving

Durant Mining Corp., 930 P.2d 575, 579 (Colo. 1997) (requiring adverse possessors to prove
color of title, but viewing the “color of title and tax payment requirements . . . in an
interchangeable manner”). But see O’Neal v. Ellison, 587 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Ark. 1979)
(“Color of title is not an essential element to a claim of adverse possession if there is actual
possession . . . .”); Okuna v. Nakahuna, 594 P.2d 128, 132 n.3 (Haw. 1979) (“[S]howing color
of title . . . is unnecessary in proving adverse possession so long as the other necessary
elements are present . . . .”).
19
See Erwin v. Miller, 45 S.E.2d 192, 194 (Ga. 1947) (recognizing good faith as an
element of adverse possession); Kaneville v. Meredith, 184 N.E. 883, 885 (Ill. 1933)
(requiring an adverse possessor to have possessed the disputed property in good faith for the
statutory period of time to prove adverse possession). See also Thomas W. Merrill, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1123-24 (1984)
(arguing that in all states, judges and juries manipulate the elements of adverse possession to
include a good faith requirement).
20

See Schulz v. Syvertsen, 591 A.2d 804, 810 n.8 (Conn. 1991) (holding that an essential
element of adverse possession is the adverse possessor holding the disputed property under a
claim of right); Smith v. Hayden, 772 P.2d 47, 52 (Colo. 1989) (holding that “one claiming
title by adverse possession must prove that his possession of the disputed parcel was actual,
adverse, hostile, under claim of right, exclusive and uninterrupted for” eighteen years).
21

See CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 325 (West 1982).

22

See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3486 (West 1994) (adverse possession of real property
requires thirty years without the need for just title or occupation in good faith). But see ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-523 (West 1992) (in some circumstances as few as three years may be
sufficient); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-30 (West 1995) (for woodlands, an adverse possessor
must satisfy a 60 year statute of limitations). Most states’ statutes of limitation range from
between ten and twenty years. See William G. Ackerman, Outlaws of the Past: A Western
Perspective on Prescription and Adverse Possession, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 79, 111-12
(1996).
23

See, e.g., Arrington v. Walter E. Heller Intern. Corp., 333 N.E.2d 50, 58 (Ill. App. Ct.
1975).
24

See Brown v. Gobble, 474 S.E.2d 489, 494 (W.Va. 1996).

25

Grace, 692 N.E.2d at 1012. See also Brown, 474 S.E.2d at 494 (accepting clear and
convincing evidence as the requisite burden of proof while recognizing that a minority
approach allows title to be transferred when the adverse possessor shows a mere
preponderance of the evidence). See also Hoffman, 994 P.2d at 109.
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the true owner of his property against the adverse possessor in favor of the true
owner.26 The Supreme Court of West Virginia, in Brown v. Gobble, explained as
follows:
The interest at stake in an adverse possession claim is not the mere loss of
money as is the case in the normal civil proceedings. Rather, it often
involves the loss of a homestead, a family farm or other property
associated with traditional family and societal values. . . . Adopting the
clear and convincing standard of proof is more than a mere academic
exercise. At a minimum, it reflects the value society places on the rights
and interests being asserted.27
Though some states do allow a less stringent burden of proof,28 the majority of states
favors the higher burden of proof.
The current doctrine of adverse possession and its interpretation and application
in contemporary courts indicates the premium that society places on protecting
property ownership. That value is reflected not only in the elements required to
sustain a claim for adverse possession, but also with the oft insisted upon element of
the adverse possessor acting in good faith.29 The states that have adopted the higher
burden of proof have likewise furthered the goal of ensuring that property owners do
not incorrectly lose their property.30 Nonetheless, even with all the safeguards built
into adverse possession, there is still a significant possibility that an innocent true
owner will unfairly lose his property to a trespasser. Chazakah provides a solution
that helps alleviate some of the problems inherent to adverse possession.

Preponderance of the evidence has been described as a fifty-one percent margin in favor of
the party that has the burden of proof. See Coleman v. Anne Arundel Co. Police Dept., 797
A.2d 770, 781 (Md. 2002). Stated another way, the preponderance of evidence standard
means that something is more likely than not correct. See Kahn v. East Side Union High
School Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 37 (Cal. 2003).
“[C]lear and convincing evidence requires more than a mere preponderance of the
evidence, but something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt or undisputed evidence.”
Zander v. Workforce Safety and Ins., 672 N.W.2d 668, 672 (N.D. 2003). See also Attorney
Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Smith, 829 A.2d 567, 583 (Md. 2003) (holding that to
prove evidence by the “clear and convincing” standard, one must prove more than a
preponderance of evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Berczyk v.
Emerson Tool Co., 291 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1008 (D. Minn. 2003).
26

See Brown, 474 S.E.2d at 494.

27

Id.

28

See Gerner v. Sullivan, 768 P.2d 701, 702-03 (Colo. 1989) (holding preponderance of
evidence, not clear and convincing evidence, is the standard of proof for adverse possession).
29

See Merrill, supra note 19, at 1123.

30

See Brown, 474 S.E.2d at 494. Additionally, even those states that reject the clear and
convincing standard might do so because of state constitutional constraints. See, e.g., Gerner,
768 P.2d at 702 (indicating that the court’s insistence on the preponderance of evidence
standard rather than the clear and convincing standard results from the state constitution’s
requirement that all civil actions carry the same burden of proof).
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III. CHAZAKAH
On its surface, chazakah appears to be very similar to adverse possession. In
fact, other than chazakah always requiring a mere three-year statute of limitations,
the doctrines appear to be identical. Nonetheless, a deeper investigation reveals that
they are, in fact, very different. Whereas adverse possession is a mechanism of land
transfer, chazakah is not. First, chazakah is only permissibly raised in support of a
claim of true ownership.31 Second, even if the adverse possessor successfully proves
all of the elements of chazakah, chazakah only results in a presumption of
ownership; it does not effectuate a land transfer by itself.32 Chazakah appears in the
Mishnah and Talmud in Tractate Bava Basra.33 Maimonides explains the Mishnaic
and Talmudic texts and formulates chazakah as black letter law.34 Maimonides
discusses chazakah in his compilation of Judaic law called Mishnah Torah.35 As the
Mishnah, the Talmud, and Maimonides make clear, although they share many
similarities, adverse possession and chazakah are really two fundamentally different
doctrines.
A. Elements: Generally
Judaic law recognizes chazakah as a mechanism through which one can assert
ownership to property.36 Though not explicitly mentioned in the Bible, the Mishnah
and Talmud derive chazakah from the verse in Deuteronomy that states, “you shall
possess [the land] and you shall settle in it.”37 The Talmud interprets this verse to
31
Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah). See also Bava Basra 28B (Talmud) (asserting that a
chazakah without an additional claim of ownership is not a valid legal argument).
32
See Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah); MOSES MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH, Toen V’Nitan,
11:1, 14:12 [hereinafter Toen V’Nitan].
33

The Mishnah and the Talmud represent portions of Judaism’s oral law. There is no real
American law equivalent in the type of work that they represent. Tractates are volumes of
Judaic law focusing primarily on one area of law. Tractate Bava Basra deals with property
transfers. The third chapter of Tractate Bava Basra discusses chazakah and how it applies to
real estate. The citations to these works will often refer to scholars who explain the Mishnaic
and Talmudic texts. Many of those scholars’ writings do not appear in separate books, but are
rather incorporated into the pages of the Mishnah and the Talmud. When studying Mishnah
and Talmud, these explanatory sources are studied along with the texts that they explain.
Therefore, when citing to the sources that accompany the Mishnah and the Talmud, the cited
source will be the text of either the Mishnah or the Talmud, with the commentator in
parentheses. Finally, throughout this article all references to the Talmud refer to the
Babylonian Talmud as opposed to the Jerusalem Talmud.
34
Maimonides lived from 1135-1204 C.E. 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA Maimonides,
Moses 754 (1994). He is regarded as the “most illustrious figure in Judaism in the posttalmudic era.” Id. One of his most prolific works, Mishnah Torah, classifies, by subject
matter, the entire Talmudic and post-Talmudic Judaic law literature; it codifies all of Jewish
law in a 14 volume black letter law compendium. Id. at 767. Mishnah Torah is relied upon as
a source that provides final rulings of law for many Judaic law questions.
35

See MAIMONIDES, Toen V’Nitan supra note 32.

36

Kiddushin 26A (Talmud) (Rabbi Asher Ben Isaac).

37

Deuteronomy 11:31.
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mean that possession occurs through settlement.38 Initially, it seems that much like
purchasing land or receiving it as a gift, chazakah is recognized as a valid form of
land transfer.39
A successful chazakah claim requires the adverse possessor to establish four
elements, all of which are reminiscent of adverse possession: Actual Possessor, (2)
Notice (Open and Notorious), (3) Hostility, and (4) Continuous Possessor for the
Statutory Period.
1. Actual Possession
Essentially, chazakah claims arise on three possible grounds. Each situation,
though, is a form of actual possession. (1) Residence. If a person lives on a plot of
land and acts as though it is his, he may qualify for asserting his ownership through
chazakah.40 This scenario requires that possessor to use the property the way owners
in that region tend to use their property.41 In other words, if the property consisted of
a house in a city, the possessor would be required to live in the house. If, however, it
were a beach house, where people only vacationed during the summer, living there
during the summer would be sufficient. (2) Improvements. A second scenario where
chazakah may be appropriate is one where the possessor makes improvements to the
property.42 If the property were a farm and the possessor can prove that he had
fertilized the field or planted crops, he would then be permitted to assert his
ownership interests via chazakah because his actions clearly indicate that he had
improved the land. (3) Benefits. Finally, when a possessor benefits directly from
property, he may assert chazakah.43 If a possessor can prove that he had eaten fruit
from trees on the property, or that he had rented a room in a house to a tenant, he
may establish that he had physically benefited from the property. He, therefore,
would be permitted to assert a valid chazakah claim. These grounds all indicate
forms of actual possession rather than abstract claims of ownership.
2. Notice (Open and Notorious) and Hostility
Second requirement of chazakah is the potential for notice. The requirement not
only calls for notice to the true owner that someone is using his property, but also
notice to the possessor that the true owner has protested and asserted his ownership
rights. The third element of Chazakah requires the possessor to be hostile as to the
true owner; a protest from the true owner within the statute of limitations destroys a
chazakah and begins an action for removal. The Mishnah in Bava Basra explains
the notice and hostility requirements. The territory surrounding and including
modern-day Israel is divided into three regions: Israel proper, called Judea;
Transjordan, the area on the eastern side of the Jordan River in present-day Jordan;

38

Kiddushin 26A (Talmud).

39

See discussion infra Part III.B., rejecting this initial approach to chazakah.

40

13 ENCYCLOPEDIA TALMUDIT Chazakah 466 (1972).

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.
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and the Galilee, land that is today in northern Israel.44 The Mishnah explains that the
possessor and the true owner must be in the same region for a chazakah claim to
ripen. “If [the true owner] was in Judea and [the possessor] took possession in the
Galilee . . . it is no chazakah, until [the true owner] is with [the possessor] in the
[same] province.”45 By way of explanation, the commentators to the Mishnah
provide as follows:
If the owner of a field located in the Galilee was living in Judea, and
someone occupied that field for three years, the chazakah is not valid.
Travel between these two regions was generally so sparse that it could not
be assumed that word of a protest lodged in one province would reach the
other province, and the situation was analogous to a border which lies
between two hostile nations. Accordingly, there was no point for the
owner of the field to protest its occupation even if he knew of the
situation, since word of his protest would not reach the occupant in any
case.46
The Mishnah clearly indicates the need for notice; however, notice is satisfied
with constructive notice rather than actual notice. If actual notice were required, it
would not matter whether the possessor and the true owner were in the same
province or in different ones, the possessor would be required to prove that the true
owner had knowledge. In fact, all the Mishnah requires is that the parties be located
within the same province so that notice is possible.47 As long as they are in the same
province, notice and hostility are presumed.48
3. Continuous Possession for the Statutory Period
The final element of chazakah requires actual possession throughout a statute of
limitations period.49 It is insufficient to simply use land in one of the three abovementioned ways and then exert a chazakah claim. Though Judaic law accepts a
three-year statute of limitations for chazakah in essentially the same way that
American law recognizes adverse possession’s statute of limitations, exactly how the
three years is calculated is the subject of some discussion.
The third chapter of Bava Basra explains as follows:

44

Bava Basra 3:2 (Mishnah). In Mishnaic times, “the land of Israel was divided into three
regions, each of which was considered a separate land in regard to the issue of chazakah . . . .”
ARTSCROLL MISHNAH SERIES: BAVA BASRA 57-58 (Rabbis Nosson Scherman et al. eds.)
(Rabbi Matis Roberts trans. 1997) [hereinafter ARTSCROLL MISHNAH].
45

Bava Basra 3:2 (Mishnah).

46

ARTSCROLL MISHNAH supra note 44, at 58 (internal citations omitted). Additionally, in
Mishnaic times the borders between the regions were actually closed; there was much more of
a separation than just sparse travel. Id. It should also be noted that if the possessor would not
be on notice that the true owner has protested, in all likelihood, the true owner would not be on
notice that someone else was occupying his land.
47

Bava Basra 3:2 (Mishnah).

48

Id.

49

Bava Basra 28A (Talmud).
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Possession of houses, pits, ditches, vaults, dovecotes, bathhouses, olive
presses, irrigated fields . . . and anything which provides benefit
continually – [must be] three years day to day. A field watered by rain
must be possessed three years, but not from day to day. Rabbi Yishmael
says: Three months in the first, three in the last, and twelve months in
between, [for] a total of eighteen months. Rabbi Akiva says: One month
in the first, one month in the last, and twelve months in between, [for] a
total of fourteen months.50
Rabbi Yishmael further limits his calculation to a field of grain.51 For an orchard
with multiple fruit and vegetable trees and plants, which ripen at different times of
year, however, if the adverse possessor harvests all of the different species in one
year, he will satisfy the three-year requirement.52 All, however, agree that possession
must be continuous.53 Citing the Talmud, the Mishnaic commentators assert that
“[o]ne can establish ownership by virtue of possession only if he retains and uses
these properties for three full years. These three years must be consecutive. If they
are not, though he uses the property for a total of three years” he has not established
a chazakah.54
At this point it seems that chazakah and adverse possession are substantially
similar; they require roughly identical elements and they both result in what appears

50

Bava Basra 3:1 (Mishnah).

51

Id.

52

Id. (Rabbi Ovadia Bartenura). The disagreement between Rabbi Yishmael and other
rabbis is based on their disparate explanations of how chazakah works. All compare chazakah
to a goring bull; while the other rabbis view the comparison in broad terms, Rabbi Yishmael
sees the comparison very narrowly. See ARTSCROLL MISHNAH, supra note 44, at 56.
The comparison works as follows: In Judaic law, if a bull gores another animal, courts
view it as an unexpected occurrence and require the owner to pay for only half of the damages
incurred because of his animal. Once a bull has gored three times, however, courts must rule
that this animal’s nature is to gore. Id. The owner will, therefore, be required to pay for full
damages resulting from his bull from then on. Id.
Perhaps this is analogous to a type of negligence standard. When an owner has no way to
know that his bull is prone to attacking other animals, courts are reluctant to impose strict
liability. When the bull has shown a penchant for disruptive behavior, though, the owner is on
notice that reasonable care requires more diligence. Only then, will courts impose full
liability.
The majority of rabbis view the bull comparison broadly. Id. If for three years a person
uses another person’s land, the other person is considered to be on notice. Courts will view
the true owner’s passive behavior as recognizing the adverse possessor as the true owner. Id.
Rabbi Yishmael, however, views the three-year requirement differently. He looks at the act of
harvesting. While harvests usually occur once a year, resulting in a three year statute of
limitations, in a field with multiple harvests in a year, each harvest puts the true owner on
notice. Each time the possessor raises and harvests crops, he is expressing his ownership. In
focusing on the number of harvests, Rabbi Yishmael employs a more narrow reading of the
comparison to goring bulls. See Bava Basra 28A, B (Talmud) (Tosafos).
53

Bava Basra 3:1 (Mishnah).

54

ARTSCROLL MISHNAH, supra note 44, at 53-54 (citing Bava Basra 29A (Talmud)).
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to be a change in ownership from the true owner to the adverse possessor.55 It is,
however, how the claims are asserted that indicates that they are of two very different
species. While adverse possession results in the actual transfer of property from the
true owner to the adverse possessor, chazakah works very differently.
B. What Chazakah is Not
1. Companion Claims and Proofs of Ownership
Most importantly, unlike in adverse possession where meeting the elements will
result in the adverse possessor becoming the owner of the property, meeting the
elements of chazakah in a vacuum will not effectuate a change in ownership. To
successfully argue that one owns land pursuant to a chazakah claim, a possessor
must assert an additional claim with his chazakah argument.56 Even with this
additional claim, chazakah will be recognized only as a proof of that companion
claim of ownership. The companion claim must follow a specific formula to warrant
chazakah as proof of ownership: The possessor must assert that he bought the
property,57 at one time had the deed, but has since lost that deed.58
2. Mishnaic and Talmudic Approaches
The Mishnah provides as follows: “Any [chazakah claim] not accompanied by a
claim [of ownership] is not a [valid] chazakah.”59 The Mishnah continues to explain
how a chazakah claim actually works by explaining how it does not work. If, when
brought to court in an ejectment proceeding, the possessor asserts that he has met the
elements of chazakah but acknowledges that he lived there “because no one ever said
anything to [him],” he will be unsuccessful in his chazakah argument.60 In other
words, if he claims that he met the elements of chazakah but that when he originally

55

Though the Judaic law texts do not expressly discuss an “exclusive” requirement, this
element may be inferred from the other requirements. If an owner is using his land together
with someone else, he is less likely to actively assert his ownership, thereby rendering moot an
exclusive requirement. See Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah) for a discussion of examples of nonexclusive possessors. The Mishnah says that “craftsmen, partners, sharecroppers, and
administrators [may not assert] chazakah.” Id. (Emphasis added). Clearly the examples of
partners and sharecroppers are instances where the possessor’s possession is not exclusive,
and in those situations chazakah is inapplicable. It would seem that, although the text does not
state exclusivity as an element, the examples given indicate that it is, nonetheless, required.
56

Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah). See also Bava Basra 28B (Talmud) (asserting a chazakah
claim without an additional claim of ownership is not a valid chazakah).
57

This is simply an example; he can likewise claim that he received it as a gift or as an
inheritance. Mishnah Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah). Additionally, if the possessor claims that he
had inherited the land, he is not required to make an additional claim; he is not obligated to
prove how the person from whom he inherited the land became the owner. Id.
58

See ARTSCROLL MISHNAH, supra note 44, at 60 (explaining Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah)).

59

Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah).

60

Id.
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began living on the land he believed that it had been ownerless,61 the true owner
would be successful in the litigation and the chazakah claim will fail.62
If, however, the possessor claims both that he has met the elements of chazakah
and that the original owner had sold him the land, but he has since lost the deed, the
possessor will be successful.63 the Mishnah creates a dichotomy by identifying two
types of chazakah claims: Those that are accompanied by a companion claim of true
ownership and those without a companion claim, made by squatters.64 A claim of
chazakah is only as strong as its companion claim.65 The resulting doctrine is the
conceptual antithesis of adverse possession. While adverse possession serves to
remove ownership from the true owner and vest it in the adverse possessor, chazakah
does no such thing. Rather, chazakah is merely proof of an independent claim of
ownership.
3. Maimondies’s Explanation
Maimonides, in his compilation of Judaic law, provides guidelines for asserting a
chazakah claim.66 He begins with a simple rule of law: Any land that A owns, even
if that land is currently being lived upon by B, still belongs to A.67 Maimonides then
provides an example to illustrate how the rule applies. B resides on a piece of
property in the way that people usually live there. For example, he lives in a house,
he rents or lends parts of the property to others, or he seeks restitution if something is
stolen from the property.68 Eventually, claiming ownership to the land, A approaches
B and initiates an action for ejectment.69 Specifically, A says to B, “This property on
which you are living is mine and I had rented it to you.”70
When B is faced with this challenge from A, his response will dictate how the
case will proceed and who will be awarded ownership of the land.71 Maimonides
describes exactly what a possessor must claim to be permitted to assert a chazakah
61

This is a concept called hefker in Judaic law. Asserting ownership over land that is
hefker is essentially asserting ownership based on the theory of discovery. Though it is
unlikely that land would be “discovered” today, the scenario refers to one that is analogous to
abandonment in the context of personal property. In American law, just as in Judaic law,
abandoned personal property may be acquired. See Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601 (La. Ct.
App. 1986).
62

Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah).

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

For example, the chazakah claim will be viewed only as strong as the claim of
ownership based on purchase or gift.
66

See MAIMONIDES, Toen V’Nitan supra note 32.

67

MAIMONIDES, Toen V’Nitan supra note 32, at 11:1.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

Id. A may likewise claim that he had lent it to B. Id. Or A may claim that B had stolen
it from him. Id.
71

Id.
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claim. Using language almost identical to the Mishnah’s, Maimonides instructs that
any chazakah unaccompanied by a companion claim is not a valid argument.72 If B
replies that, contrary to A’s claim, A had actually sold the land to B or had given it to
him as a gift, the burden of proof rests with A to prove that he was the true owner of
the land and that B was squatting on his land.73 If A successfully proves that he is the
true owner of the land, he will retain ownership; if not, the court will award the
property to B.74 Maimonides continues by explaining that a chazakah is
inappropriate in the following scenario: B consumes produce from the property for a
number of years and A, the true owner, approaches B, claiming ownership.75 If B
responds to A’s claim by saying that he knew of no owner when he first came to the
land, or if B claims that he has been on the land for a number of years and no one had
said anything to him, courts will not accept chazakah as proof of his ownership.76
Only when B asserts an independent claim of ownership77 will courts permit him to
assert his compliance with the elements of chazakah, and then only as proof that he
owns the land.78
Maimonides clarifies the overarching rule of the chazakah doctrine. Rather than
chazakah creating ownership, it is merely a proof of ownership. Without an
independent claim of ownership, satisfying the elements of chazakah is worthless.
In adverse possession, the only way a true owner can retain ownership is to disprove
one of the elements of the adverse possession claim. Chazakah is different. For the
true owner to be successful in defending his property, he may attack the elements of
chazakah,79 or he may attack the sufficiency of the underlying transaction.80 The
difference between adverse possession and chazakah can be boiled down to one
point: Adverse possession is a mechanism through which one obtains ownership in
property; chazakah merely creates a very strong, but rebuttable, presumption of
ownership. It is evidence of a transaction, not the transaction itself.

72

Id. at 14:12. See also Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah).

73

MAIMONIDES, Toen V’Nitan supra note 32, at 11:1. B does not automatically take title to
the land; rather, he is required to affirm in court that he is not asserting a false claim. Id.
74

Id.

75

Id. at 14:12.

76

Id.

77

That he bought the land or received it as a gift, for example.

78

MAIMONIDES, Toen V’Nitan supra note 32, at 14:12.

79

He may, for example, establish that the possessor had occupied the land for only two
years. Successfully disproving any of the elements would destroy chazakah as a proof of
ownership.
80

Even if the possessor successfully satisfied the elements of chazakah, if the true owner
proves that a transaction never occurred, the true owner would remain the owner of the
property. See Bava Basra 3:3 (Mishnah); MAIMONIDES, Toen V’Nitan supra note 32, at 11:1,
14:12.
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C. Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom: Illustrating the Difference Between
Chazakah and Adverse Possession
Perhaps the best way to explain how adverse possession and chazakah differ is to
apply the doctrines to facts that would give rise to the claims. The Alaska Supreme
Court, in Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, presented a classic case of adverse possession.81
Though the court found that the possessors had established facts sufficient for an
adverse possession claim,82 those facts alone would not support a chazakah claim.
In Nome 2000, the adverse possessors established the following facts: The
parties disputed the ownership of seven and a half acres of land overlooking the
Nome River.83 Nome 2000 was the true owner and titleholder for that property.84
The disputed parcel was located in a rural area, which was suitable for seasonal,
recreational activities, but at other times was virtually useless.85 From as early as
1944, Charles Fagerstrom began using the disputed parcel of land.86 Around 1970,
the Fagerstroms built a picnic area on the disputed parcel. This area included a
gravel pit, beachwood blocks that served as chairs, firewood, and a 50-gallon barrel
that they used as a stove.87 The Fagerstroms also brought a camper trailer to the area,
planted trees, and built an outhouse, fish rack, and reindeer shelter on the property.88
Eventually, the Fagerstroms even built a cabin on the land.89 They continued to live
there, at least in the summers, until Nome 2000 filed suit on July 24, 1987. The
Fagerstroms could declare over forty years worth of possession for the disputed
property, well in excess of the ten-year statute of limitations required under Alaska
law.90
The Fagerstroms, however, never claimed that they bought the land. Nor did
they ever claim that they received a grant from the government for the disputed
parcel.91 Essentially, all they asserted was that they were the only ones using the
land over the last forty years. Prior to that time, it appeared to be abandoned
property, seemingly ownerless. The Alaska Supreme Court applied the facts to the
elements of adverse possession. The court began by describing the elements of
adverse possession: “In order to acquire title by adverse possession, the claimant
81

Nome 2000, 799 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1990).

82

This was true for the northerly portion of the property in question. See id. at 311. For
purposes of this example, therefore, this paper will focus only on the evidence established for
the northerly portion of the property.
83

Id. at 306.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 307.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

Id. at 308.

90

Id.

91

They had, however, received a similar grant for surrounding plots of land. See id. at

307.
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must prove . . . that for the statutory period ‘his use of the land was continuous, open
and notorious, exclusive and hostile to the true owner.’”92 The court reasoned as
follows:
The disputed parcel is located in a rural area suitable as a seasonal
homesite for subsistence and recreational activities. This is exactly how
the Fagerstroms used it . . . . On the premises throughout the entire year
were an outhouse, a fish rack, a large reindeer pen (which, for six weeks,
housed a reindeer), a picnic area, a small quantity of building materials
and some trees not indigenous to the area. During the warmer season, for
about 13 weeks, the Fagerstroms also placed a camper trailer on blocks on
the disputed parcel. The Fagerstroms and their children visited the
property several times during the warmer season to fish, gather berries,
clean the premises, and play. In total, their conduct and improvements
went well beyond “mere casual and occasional trespasses” and instead
“evince[d] a purpose to exercise exclusive dominion over the property.”93
The court continued, discussing how the Fagerstroms had met the elements of
adverse possession:
With respect to the notoriety requirement, a quick investigation of the
premises, especially during the season which it was best suited for use,
would have been sufficient to place a reasonably diligent landowner on
notice that someone may have been exercising dominion and control over
at least the northern portion of the property. Upon such notice, further
inquiry would indicate that members of the community regarded the
Fagerstroms as the owners. Continuous, exclusive, and [open and]
notorious possession were thus established.94
Recognizing an objective test, the court held that by acting toward the land as
owners, the Fagerstroms met the hostility requirement; the court rejected Nome
2000’s argument that the possessor’s intent matters.95 When a possessor acts as
though he owns land, he will be deemed to have satisfied the hostility requirement.
Courts simply engage in a matching game, essentially viewing the facts and the
elements in two columns. If a fact from column A can be matched with an element
from column B and none of the elements will be left without a matching fact, a court
will declare that adverse possession is met. A possessor successfully winning the
matching game becomes the proud new owner of a parcel of land. This process was
clearly at play in Nome 2000; all the court had to do was list the elements, find the
facts that supported the elements, and rule in favor of the possessors. Under adverse
possession, nothing more is required.
Applying the facts of Nome 2000 to chazakah would require a different result.
The analysis should proceed as follows:
92

Id. at 309 (quoting Smith v. Krebs, 768 P.2d 124, 125 (Alaska 1989)).

93

Id. at 310 (quoting Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 830-31
(Alaska 1974)) (emphasis added).
94

Id. (emphasis added).

95

Id.
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Though there is no clear evidence that Nome 2000 actually resided in Alaska,
there was ample evidence of at least constructive notice.96 The facts give no
indication that Nome 2000’s potential objections to the Fagerstroms’ activities would
have gone unheard. The court also established that the Fagerstroms satisfied the
hostility and continuous requirements far in excess of the three-year chazakah statute
of limitations.97
Nonetheless, under chazakah, the court would have been forced to reach a
different conclusion. The Fagerstroms never made any claim of rightful ownership.
In fact, they all but admitted that they did not buy the land or acquire it through any
other acceptable method of acquisition (save meeting the elements of adverse
possession). Rather than granting the land to the Fagerstroms, the court would have
been required to accept Nome 2000’s title as valid and allow Nome 2000 to retain
ownership over the land. The facts in Nome 2000 do not support a finding for the
Fagerstroms under chazakah because although the Fagerstroms would prove the
elements of chazakah, they would still lack the most important ingredient necessary
to become the owners, which is a claim of ownership.98
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION
A. Introduction
Adverse possession is both justified and criticized on a number of grounds.
Adopting chazakah presents an opportunity to alleviate the major criticisms of
adverse possession while retaining many of the benefits of the current system. This
section outlines some of the major justifications for adverse possession. The
justifications for adverse possession fit into three categories: (1) Statute of
Limitations Arguments, (2) Economic Arguments, and (3) Moral Arguments.99
B. Statute of Limitations Arguments
The “running of the statute of limitations” justification for adverse possession
looks at adverse possession as similar to a defense to any tort. A plaintiff has a
certain amount of time within which to bring suit for harms that he has suffered.100 A
party failing to bring suit within that period of time is barred from litigating that
cause of action.101 In the case of adverse possession, the rationale goes as follows: A
true owner who fails to bring a claim for trespass within the statute of limitations for
adverse possession is barred from suing the adverse possessor.102
96

Id.

97

See id.

98

This is not to suggest that all cases of adverse possession would result in findings
favoring true owners; rather, chazakah would require adverse possessors to modify their
claims and assert adverse possession only as a supplement to a claim of true ownership.
99

Though there may be some overlap in the categories in which some of the arguments fit,
they will be presented in the categories that seem most appropriate.
100

See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 90 (5th ed. 1998).

101

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).

102

This view of adverse possession works especially well when the adverse possession
claim is raised as a defense to a trespass claim rather than as an action brought by the adverse
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This view of the statute of limitations prevents true owners from suing to protect
against litigation based on “stale evidence.”103 The stale evidence factor highlights
the concern that adverse possessors will be disadvantaged in defending against
trespass claims because evidence proffered will often be many years, if not
generations, old.104 Most adverse possession claims arise out of mistakes caused by
uncertainty over boundary lines, mistakes that may take years to even be realized.105
Simply put, adverse possession prevents a possessor from being penalized by an
untimely claim.106 The statute of limitations, like the statutes of limitations for other

possessor to quiet title. A variation on this view of the statute of limitations argument is that
adverse possession serves to punish true owners. CHARLES C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE
POSSESSION 43-45, 90 (1961). The punishment is on two grounds: (1) The true owner’s failure
to raise his trespass claim in a timely manner and (2) to punish the true owner for not
adequately using his land. The first rationale is merely the inverse of the classical statute of
limitations argument; by protecting the defendant from having to litigate a stale claim, the
plaintiff is necessarily punished.
Unlike in the classical sense of adverse possession, where the suit would be “barred,”
here, rather than preventing the suit’s litigation, courts do hear cases and, if the elements are
met, “give the possessor ‘title’ to the land.” Id. at 43. Take, for example, Ohio’s one-year
statute of limitations for slander: After that year, a suit for slander will not proceed. Id.; OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (West 2003). In adverse possession, rather than the statute
preventing the suit from proceeding, the statute serves as a timeframe: Within the statute of
limitations, ownership remains with the true owner; after the statute of limitations, ownership
transfers to the possessor.
Rather than simply a device through which suits are barred, “adverse possession is a
transfer effected by the statutes of limitations.” POSNER, supra note 100, at 90.
103
See POSNER, supra note 100, at 90. See also CALLAHAN, supra note 102, at 83. Some
have argued that statutes of limitations are “a practical device to spare the courts from
litigation of old causes of action; but this has been denied vigorously . . . on the ground that
since courts are established to deal with litigation it would be strange to forbid litigation so as
not to bother courts.” CALLAHAN at 86. Barring the litigation of “stale claims” serves two
purposes. First, it helps minimize the costs inherent in corroborating deteriorated evidence, a
natural result of claims that are many years old. Merrill, supra note 19 at 1128. Second,
preventing “stale claims” assists in creating a system that is fairer for defendants by not
requiring them to defend against claims based on old evidence. Id.
104

CALLAHAN, supra note 102, at 83. “It is said, so frequently as to become monotonous,
that statutes of limitations are designed to protect against stale claims after evidence has
become lost, memories have faded and witnesses have disappeared.” Id. (emphasis added).
There is an inherent tension in adverse possession questions: On the one hand, states require a
relatively long period of time for their statutes of limitations for adverse possession, ostensibly
to protect true owners. See Brown, 474 S.E.2d at 494. On the other hand, however, the
extended period for adverse possession’s statutes of limitations increases the effects of lost
evidence, faded memories, and witnesses who have disappeared.
105

POSNER, supra note 100, at 90.

106

CALLAHAN, supra note 102, at 84. The notion that the statute of limitations protects
against untimely claims has a critical limitation: statutes of limitation remedy the concern that
evidence will not be preserved. “This concern is with the preservation of a potential
defendant’s evidence, not a plaintiff’s; and it is limited to claims which it is assumed [the
defendant] could have resisted successfully had the lost evidence been available.” Id.
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claims, protects defendants by preventing plaintiffs from winning claims based on
“stale evidence.”107
C. Economic Arguments
There are essentially three economic justifications for adverse possession. First,
adverse possession encourages the beneficial use of property.108 Second, adverse
possession tends to make the real estate market more efficient.109 Finally, adverse
possession protects the reliance interests accrued during the time of the adverse
possessor’s occupation of the property.110
Adverse possession encourages property owners to put their land to productive
use rather than allow the property to lie fallow. Putting property to use benefits the
economy. Adverse possession has been heralded as “a wonderful example of reward
to useful labor, at the expense of the sluggard.”111 Rather than looking at the results
of adverse possession as penalizing true owners, proponents of adverse possession
regard adverse possession as rewarding possessors for positive acts in cultivating
land.112 Adverse possession often has the effect of reducing the valuable resources
that are left idle for lengthy periods of time; it establishes procedures for productive
users to gain ownership over unproductive users.113 Though this theory refuses to
recognize that a productive use of property might be to let it remain unused until a
later date, what remains is that adverse possession encourages people, whether true
owners or adverse possessors, to use land and reap the valuable economic gains
resulting therefrom.114
This justification for adverse possession “seems to rest on a social policy
favoring ‘active’ owners of property, who develop . . . land, rather than ‘passive’

107
POSNER, supra note 100, at 90. This also has a relationship to the economic arguments.
Specifically, there is a cost inherent to mistakes of judgment arising out of stale claims. This
point, though, will be discussed in more detail in the section dealing with the economic
justifications of adverse possession.
108
CALLAHAN, supra note 102, at 91; CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY
(1994).

AND

PERSUASION 15

109

COOTER & ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 156 (1988); Miceli, supra note 3, at 161;
POSNER, supra note 100, at 90, this is essentially the reduction of the error costs.
110

POSNER, supra note 100, at 90; ROSE, supra note 108, at 15.

111

ROSE, supra note 108, at 15.

112

CALLAHAN, supra note 102, at 90-91.

113

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 109, at 156.

114

Merrill, supra note 19, at 1130. A policy requiring property owners to use their land
“seems dubious, because it ignores the possibility that passive owners, such as land
speculators, may perform a valuable social function by preserving the property for use by
future generations.” Id. Additionally, “there is a potential inefficiency of the rule: if the
original owner values not using his property more than the adverse possessor values its use,
then title should remain with the original owner.” COOTER & ULEN, supra note 109, at 156.
Even with these drawbacks to economic justifications for adverse possession, it is unclear that
courts actually balance the interests of the parties when making determinations in adverse
possession cases.
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owners” who do not cultivate their property.115 A close look at this justification and
its criticisms116 reveals how little a true owner must do to avoid losing his land.117
“The [true owner] does not have to develop his land or even occupy it; all he has to
do periodically is assert his right to exclude others.”118 By rewarding those who
beneficially use land, adverse possession aids in creating a more economically
productive system; this system is brought back to equilibrium to protect true owners
by requiring very little of true owners for them to retain ownership of their property.
The second economic justification for adverse possession is that creates a more
efficient and less costly real estate market. Again, adverse possession shows a
preference for active possessors over passive owners.119
The passive (and presumably absentee) owner will be harder to negotiate
with, if only because he will be harder to locate. When the [true owner] is
required to assert his right to exclude . . . he is in effect being asked to
“flush out” offers to purchase his property, to make a market in the land
. . . . [T]he sleeping-owner rationale is again a justification based on the
desirability of encouraging market transactions in property rights.120
By transferring title to an adverse possessor, making him into a true owner,
adverse possession increases market efficiency. One of the goals of adverse
possession is to create certainty in the real estate market.121 More certainty should
equal more efficiency. Adverse possession reduces the “administration costs of
establishing rightful ownership claims in the event of a delayed dispute about
rightful ownership.”122 Assume that A is a true owner and B is an adverse possessor
who has met all the elements of adverse possession. After seventy-five years,123 B
sells Blackacre to C. Absent adverse possession, if A sues C over Blackacre, an
inefficiency would exist in the real estate market. The administrative costs of
litigating suits like these would increase the cost of buying the property. “Adverse
possession clears title of the clouds (as they are called) upon it from past wrongs, so
buyers need not fear the assertion of third party claims based upon events of the
distant past.”124 Adverse possession allows purchase prices to reflect land values
rather than insurance against suits and costs of researching ownership.
The efficiency argument takes an additional form, one that closely relates to the
statute of limitations justifications. Recognizing adverse possession as a method of

115

Merrill, supra note 19, at 1130.

116

See supra note 114.

117

Merrill, supra note 19, at 1130.

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Id. at 1130-1131 (emphasis added).

121

JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW 226 (3d ed. 2002).

122

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 109, at 155.

123

This period of time would satisfy even the lengthiest of statutes of limitations.

124

Id.
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land transfer reduces “error costs” caused by using stale evidence in dispute
resolution.125 This goes beyond looking simply at the adverse possessor versus the
true owner. Adverse possession is a tool that has the effect of clearing up title for
generations, for numerous buyers.126 Adverse possession requires a vision of the
future. Ownership of land affects future buyers and the banks or other institutions
that will advance funds for the purchase of that property. Individuals need to know
who owns the property they wish to buy or for which they intend to provide a
mortgage.127 Allowing adverse possession to effect a transfer both reduces search
costs of investigating who holds title to property and aids in a system where recorded
titles are incomplete indices of ownership.128
Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing in 1897, discussed the economic implications
and justifications of adverse possession.129 We can view the ownership of a piece of
property like a scale. On the one side is the adverse possessor. He has lived on the
land, used the land, and generally regarded the land as belonging to him. On the
other side of the balance is the true owner.130 For a long period of time, he has made
no indication that he has any ownership stake in the land. During the time when the
adverse possessor resides on the property, he builds an attachment to that land. Over
the same period of time, the true owner’s attachment to the same piece of land is
necessarily reduced.131 Were the adverse possessor to lose the land in favor of the
true owner, the loss, both economic and moral, suffered by the adverse possessor
would far outweigh the gain experienced by the true owner.132
This justification for adverse possession can be quantified by the theory of
“diminishing marginal utility of income.”133 If a court would award the disputed
property to the true owner, the adverse possessor would experience the loss of the
property as a diminution in his wealth. The true owner would view the restoration of
the property as an increase in his wealth.134 This argument asserts that if both the
adverse possessor and the true owner have the same wealth, “then probably their
combined utility will be greater if the adverse possessor is allowed to keep the

125

POSNER, supra note 100, at 90.

126

Id.

127

Id.

128
Id. This second outcome of adverse possession, allowing adverse possession as a
means of remedying an incomplete recording system, however, something of a self-fulfilling
prophecy. By recognizing adverse possession as a means of obtaining ownership, the
incomplete system is reinforced and perpetuated rather than remedied. Adverse possession,
itself, is an institution that validates the unrecorded “ownership” of property.
129

Id. at 89 (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457,
477 (1897)).
130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Id. at 89-90.

134

Id. at 90.
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property.”135 Clearly, the adverse possessor was using the property,136 and the true
owner was not.137 Therefore, by removing property from someone who has relied
upon his ownership of the property and is deriving actual benefit from it and giving it
to someone who is deriving no actual benefit from it and has not, within the last
many years at least, relied upon his ownership, marginal utility of income is reduced.
D. Moral Arguments
The final justification for adverse possession rests on the morality of keeping
land in the possession of the adverse possessor. Again, Holmes is instructive. In a
letter to William James, Holmes wrote that the adverse possessor “shape[s] his roots
to his surroundings, and when the roots have grown to a certain size, cannot be
displaced without cutting at his life.”138 Property rights are based on more than
formal documents; they are based also on expectations. Those expectations “grow
from informal arrangements such as long-standing possession, a course of dealings,
oral statements, informal understandings, personal relationships, social practices, and
customs of trade.”139 The notion that long-standing possession creates an expectation
of ownership is exactly the idea that justifies adverse possession. The moral
argument justifying adverse possession views “long-standing possession” as
equivalent to a written document of ownership. If those are viewed equally, then
adverse possession places courts on the moral high ground by favoring the party that
stands to lose the most, the adverse possessor. A ruling against the adverse
possessor would result in the court “cutting at his life.”140
Often, the moral justifications are intertwined with reliance justifications.
Protecting the reliance on relationships has been deemed a valuable moral
justification for adverse possession.141 This theory asserts that over time, in this
instance the period of the statute of limitations, the adverse possessor grows to rely
on the true owner’s acquiescence that the owner will not interfere with the
135

Id.

136

This obviously is true because one of the elements of adverse possession is “open and
notorious” possession. Without actually using the property, the adverse possessor is unlikely
to be able to prove that he openly possessed the property.
137
This must likewise be true because of the “exclusive” element of adverse possession; if
the true owner also uses the land, the adverse possessor’s claim fails.
138

Tioga Coal Co. v. Supermkts. Gen. Corp., 546 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. 1988) (quoting Justice
Holmes).
139

JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 45-46 (2000).

140

Id. at 46. See also MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993). A
theory called Lockean Entitlement advocates for land to stay with the possessor who has used
the property beneficially over the owner who has been passive in his ownership.
[T]he pure Lockean theory does not countenance adverse possession. But perhaps it
colors the theory of adverse possession anyway by lending some sympathy to
“squatters.” After all, if property is acquired from the common by a nonowner simply
by taking it and using it, can we not sympathize with someone who does likewise with
owned but unused property, especially if she does not know it is owned?
Id. at 112.
141

SINGER, supra note 121, at 229.
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possessor’s possession.142 “The possessor comes to expect and may have come to
rely on the fact that the true owner will not interfere with the possessor’s use of the
property . . . and the true owner has fed those expectations by her actions (or her
failure to act).”143
Professor Margaret Jane Radin suggested another moral argument in favor of
adverse possession. Building on Holmes’s explanation that taking property away
from an adverse possessor results in “cutting at his life,” Radin presents an argument
based on justice and fairness.144 Property interests in personal property must be
distinguished from property interests in fungible property.145 Fungible property is
property that is capable of being replaced with money, whereas personal property
“has become bound up with the personhood of the holder [that it] is no longer
commensurate with money.”146 While the adverse possessor’s interest is initially
fungible, it becomes increasingly more personal over time.147 Conversely, over the
same period of time, the true owner’s interest becomes less and less personal,
becoming ever more fungible.148 Adverse possession advocates awarding the
property to the party who will be less easily compensated for losing that piece of
land. In fact, as Radin’s argument goes, justice requires such a result.149
V. CRITICISMS OF ADVERSE POSSESSION
A. Introduction
Adverse possession, though justified on numerous grounds, is riddled with
criticisms. Though a great deal of ink has been spilled to justify adverse possession
from an economic point of view,150 one of the major criticisms of adverse possession
rests in the economic havoc that adverse possession wreaks.151 Additionally, and
perhaps most importantly, is the criticism that adverse possession is simply unfair.152
142

Id.

143

Id. (quoting Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV.
611, 666-667 (1988)). It would seem that there is a flaw in this argument. If the justification
for adverse possession is based on the possessor’s reliance on the owner’s consent, tacit
though it may be, the hostility element of adverse possession is destroyed, thus requiring a
finding in favor of the true owner, not the adverse possessor.
144

Id. at 228 (citing Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U.
L.Q. 739, 748 n.26 (1986)).
145

Id.

146

Id. (quoting Radin, 64 Wash. U. L.Q. at 748).

147

Id.

148

Id.

149

Id.

150

See supra Part IV.C.

151

Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 Geo. L.J. 2419, 2432
(2001).
152

Carl W. Herstein, Annual Survey of Michigan Law, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 815, 889 n.281
(2002).
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Finally, unlike all other land transfers and methods of acquiring property, adverse
possession allows acquisition with nothing more than unilateral actions taken by
adverse possessors.153 Every other method of land transfer is bilateral in nature,
requiring actions taken by both parties to the transaction. What chazakah provides is
the ability to reduce the economic costs of adverse possession through a more just
system, which relies on the classical bilateral actions that typically create land
transfers.
B. Economic Costs of Adverse Possession
There are a number of costs associated with adverse possession. First, a result of
adverse possession is the diminished utility in property.154 Diminished utility results
because under adverse possession true owners are less inclined to allow people to use
their property.155 This occurs even, if not especially, when the true owner is not
himself using the property and may not even be bothered by the trespasser.156 Rather
than risk losing his land to an adverse possessor, a true owner is more vigilant about
removing trespassers.157 This fear of losing property results in a net loss in the value
derived from the land. Instead of the land giving benefit (albeit to the trespasser),
that benefit is lost. This loss illustrates a deficiency in adverse possession.158
There are other costs resulting from adverse possession. To protect their land
from the possibility of losing it to adverse possessors, true owners are forced to
spend money to monitor their property.159 Assets that could be otherwise spent must
now be devoted to continually traveling the metes and bounds of one’s property, or
finding some other method of ensuring that trespassers do not spend extended
periods of time on a true owner’s property. It is not entirely clear that society
benefits from this duty imposed on landowners. In all likelihood, the time and
money expended on monitoring the land results in nothing more than a waste of
resources.160

153

Perhaps the one exception to this is discovery. Nonetheless, discovery differs from
adverse possession, in that no one loses land as a result of discovery; it is simply not a land
transfer. Even abandonment, another example of a party acquiring land where no one loses
anything, requires an affirmative act by the original owner. Adverse possession does not
require any such act by the true owner. To the contrary, an act of abandonment would
alleviate the need for the adverse possessor to prove the elements of adverse possession.
Finally, prescriptive easements do not result in the transfer of property ownership, only the
right to use. The right to use is only one stick in the “bundle of rights” associated with
property ownership. Adverse possession, in contrast, transfers the entire bundle of sticks.
154

Stake, supra note 151, at 2432.

155

Id. at 2432-33.

156

If the true owner were using the property, the “exclusive” element of adverse possession
might be destroyed.
157

Indeed, vigilance, or rather the lack thereof, is cited as a justification for adverse
possession.
158

Stake, supra note 151, at 2432-33.

159

Id.

160

Id.
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In addition to the losses experienced by the reduced incentive to allow people to
use otherwise unused property and the wasted funds spent on increased monitoring
of land, there is another potential cost to adverse possession. Adverse possession, it
is said, encourages people to productively use land.161 It is possible, however, that
the best use of land is not “using” it at all.162 Sometimes allowing land to remain
unused is an investment for the future. In such an instance, not using the land might
be the best “use” the owner can put it to at a given time. Trespassers are encouraged
to make changes to the land, if only to become adverse possessors. Land that a true
owner intends to set aside to remain in its pristine, natural state, undeveloped, and
unharmed by human contamination, may fall prey to the whims of an opportunistic
trespasser, who sees this oasis of natural splendor as the perfect site to build a
garbage dump or an aluminum reduction facility. Adverse possession has the side
effect of encouraging land development, even in instances where doing so might not
be putting the land to its optimal use.163 By rewarding adverse possessors for
destroying natural landscapes, adverse possession detracts from the overall utility of
the property.164
C. Adverse Possession’s Unfairness
When the doctrine of adverse possession is taught in law school property classes,
it is often met with hostility from students who prefer a system that respects the
autonomy of property owners. That autonomy, they believe, should include the right
not to use one’s land. This is essentially an invocation of the “unfairness” criticism
of adverse possession. Adverse possession all but ensures that there will be
instances where “poor, unsuspecting, innocent owners lose all or part of their land
without having done anything wrong.”165 Even in instances where a true owner has
been less than vigilant in overseeing his property, adverse possession still seems
unfair. At the end of the day, when evaluating the competing claims for the
property, adverse possession ignores the reality that the true owner paid for the
property, whereas the adverse possessor, by definition, did not.166 This doctrine also
appears to reward an individual for essentially stealing another’s property.167
161

This has been cited as a justification for adverse possession. See Cooter & Ulen, supra
note 109.
162

Stake, supra note 151, at 2433.

163

Id.

164

The immediate benefits resulting from encouraging people to use land should at least be
balanced with the foregone benefits that the land might have produced in the future. It is quite
possible that those benefits would far outweigh any benefits possibly reaped by using land
simply for the purpose of showing ownership over it, whether that use is done by the true
owner to protect his rights, or by the adverse possessor to secure an interest in someone else’s
land.
165

Id. at 2434. It would likewise seem unfair that a court could require a person to monitor
his land just to retain ownership over it.
166

Herstein, supra note 152, at 889 n.281.

167

Id. Even in instances of good faith occupations by adverse possessors, the truth of the
matter is that the adverse possessor was using something that did not belong to him. The
result of adverse possession is unjust; we reward trespassers for continuously trespassing.
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Adverse possession essentially becomes state-sponsored trespassing, rewarding a
trespasser with the property on which he has violated another’s ownership interests.
D. Bilateral Nature of Other Land Transfers vs. Unilateral Nature
of Adverse Possession
Finally, when addressing how adverse possession occurs, it becomes clear that it
is simply the result of unilateral acts. Typical property transfers, by contrast, occur
through bilateral methods. In the case of property acquired through sale, there must
be a buyer and a seller. Likewise, a gift requires a donor and a donee, an inheritance
needs bequeathor and an inheritor, and conquest requires a conqueror and a
vanquished. In each instance, there is a party giving and a party receiving. Even
when looking to personal property, for a finder to become an owner, the original
owner must abandon the property.168 Never does one acquire something without
someone else giving it up.169

168

See supra, note 2.

169
Even in the most unilateral-looking methods of acquiring land, a bilateral aspect still
exists. In American history, the example of the squatters looks like a unilateral act. On its
surface, it seems that the squatters of America’s early years would move onto a plot of land,
work the land, and eventually own the land; seemingly, their actions alone created their
ownership rights in the land. A closer look at the forces at play in the squatters example,
however, indicates that there really was another party to the acquisition; not only did the
squatters act, but the government also acted. In the case of those squatters and others after
them, but for the eventual government acquiescence, the squatters’ rights were only as strong
as their protests. Essentially, before the U.S. government gave in, the squatters were
successful only by frightening off potential buyers at government auctions.
From the survey Ordinance of 1785 on, squatters settled large areas of the public lands
in defiance of law . . . without color of title other than that created by the impact of
popular feeling that would not be denied. At government auctions, they assembled in
force unlawfully to frighten off free outside bidding and prevent competition from
forcing any of their company to pay the public land office more than the legal
minimum . . . . Often unlawful in origin, settlement nevertheless quickly brought
effective demand for law.
SINGER, supra note 121, at 27 (quoting JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF
FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 3-5 (1956) (discussing the squatters of
Pike Creek, Wisconsin)). “A whole continent was sold or given away – to veterans, settlers,
squatters, railroads, [and] states . . . .” SINGER, supra note 121, at 26 (quoting LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 231 (2d ed. 1985) (emphasis added)). Clearly,
squatters owned nothing without some government action. When the government eventually
gave in to the squatters, the other half of bilateralism occurred.
Compare the experience of the squatters with that of the freed slaves in the post-Civil War
era. “When planters had fled, abandoning their properties, the freed slaves had in numerous
instances seized control and they gave little indication after the war of yielding their authority
to the returning owners.” LEON LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF
SLAVERY 399-407 (1980). Nonetheless, although some of the freed slaves were able to
acquire land through the Homestead Act of 1861, state governments refused to allow them to
claim ownership of the land of the former slaveholders. Id. Though one could argue that the
former slave owners’ abandonment of the property provided the second half of the bilateral
action, courts refused to accept that argument in light of President Andrew Jackson’s
Proclamation of Amnesty on May 29, 1865. Id. Unlike in the case of the squatters, where the
government claimed ownership of the land in question, and were thus in a position to grant the
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It appears that in all instances of acquiring property, ownership results from
bilateral activities. Adverse possession, however, requires a different conclusion.
Adverse possession is the poster-child for unilateral activities resulting in claims of
ownership. Unlike theft, where ownership based on unilateral actions is not
recognized, adverse possession allows the actions of the adverse possessor to vest
title in him at the expense of the non-acting true owner.
VI. CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM CHAZAKAH
Chazakah satisfies adverse possession’s justifications. The analysis of how
chazakah satisfies the “statutes of limitation” justification for adverse possession
begins with a recognition that unlike the statutes of limitation for other torts, which
prevent a case’s litigation, the statute of limitations for adverse possession does
not.170 Statutes of limitation are designed to prevent plaintiffs from taking advantage
of lost or otherwise damaged evidence, which naturally occurs over time.171
Chazakah is a doctrine that not only recognizes the potential for lost evidence, but is
also based on that potential. Chazakah claims arise because an adverse possessor
claims ownership but cannot document ownership because of the passage of time,
the very “stale evidence” contemplated by a statute of limitations.172
Under chazakah, once the adverse possessor proves the elements of adverse
possession, the burden of proof shifts to the true owner. While the adverse possessor
might have difficulty defending against a trespass claim simply because of the
passage of time, chazakah provides him an escape hatch. If the adverse possessor
claims rightful ownership and proves the elements of adverse possession, the true
owner will have the burden of disproving the ownership. The potential for a
defendant having to defend against a claim where his evidence has been lost is
rectified by a system that requires the one attempting to take the land, the true owner,
to have preserved evidence. Chazakah requires no more instances of litigation than
does adverse possession. It is a system that gives true owners the ability to regain
what was taken from them without compensation,173 while still protecting an adverse
possessor from a claim based on stale evidence.
Chazakah likewise maintains the status quo on the economic justifications of
adverse possession. Chazakah encourages the beneficial use of property and protects
reasonable reliance interests. It does so, not by creating a system that dictates that
the beneficial use of property is to build on it, but rather by creating a system that
rewards any use of property, even a use that seems to be no use at all. This makes
land to the squatters, the government did not claim that it owned the land of the former slave
owners, and could not, therefore, give anything to the freed slaves.
170

See supra, note 104. This is necessary because chazakah requires litigation.
Nonetheless, chazakah does not require more litigation than adverse possession.
171
See Callahan, supra note 102, at 83; Merrill, supra note 19, at 1128; Posner, supra note
100, at 90.
172
Were that not the case, and the adverse possessor capable of producing the deed, the
chazakah claim would be irrelevant; the deed, rather than the occupation, would prove
ownership.
173
See supra note 102. Statutes of limitation are designed to protect defendants from
claims based on stale evidence, but if the evidence has not been lost, perhaps a different result
makes sense.
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economic sense; what today might be worth $1,000 if one were to build on it, might
just as well be worth $10,000 five years from now. Imagine that A owns Blackacre,
which might be worth only $24 dollar’s worth of trinkets today. It may, however, be
worth many billions if not trillions of dollars many years later.174 Nonetheless, it is
possible that actually using the land might be beneficial and that does not go unrewarded.175
An adverse possessor under chazakah who uses the land does not walk away
empty handed. If he proves the elements of adverse possession, he retains a
presumption of ownership. An adverse possessor’s work is rewarded with a
presumption of ownership, but not with the rights to continue to occupy property that
he stole, if that is in fact the case. Chazakah provides the adverse possessor with an
opportunity to retain ownership, but only if he is adjudged to have a rightful claim of
ownership. It does not punish a true owner for owning land but not wanting to “use”
the land in the active sense.
The efficiency argument may seem to be lost in chazakah because there is the
potential that one who buys land from an adverse possessor will be required to return
it to the true owner, but that is not quite the case. The efficiency argument seems to
be significantly overstated because it relies heavily upon the assumption that adverse
possession creates greater predictability in the real estate market. Undoubtedly, there
will be instances where one who buys land from an adverse possessor will be
required to relinquish that property back to the true owner, but this is true under both
adverse possession and chazakah. If a court were to find that the adverse possessor
failed to prove one of the elements of adverse possession, then an otherwise
legitimate buyer would be buying land from a trespasser rather than an owner.
Chazakah, while creating a system that is more protective of true owners, places only
the trespasser in a more costly position than he would otherwise be under adverse
possession.176
Shaping one’s roots to his surroundings does not create ownership, buying land
does. Morality dictates that people who have claims of ownership should own land.
Having merely a claim of occupation does not create ownership. But even under
chazakah, Holmes should be satisfied. The occupier enters court with a presumption
174
According to legend, Peter Minuit bought Manhattan Island from the Manhattan Indian
Tribe for trinkets worth about $24 and the United States bought the Louisiana Purchase from
France for nearly $15 million. Britannica Concise Encyclopedia, Minuit, Peter (2003) at
http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article?eu=397555 (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
175

Remember that the adverse possessor in chazakah still leaves with a presumption of
ownership.
176

But even under chazakah, the adverse possessor is not in a bad position. Assume that
an adverse possessor sells land for $1,000. If the true owner successfully proves that the
adverse possessor had no ownership interest in the land under chazakah, the buyer would be
forced to relinquish the land back to the true owner. But all is not lost for the buyer; he can
still bring an action against the adverse possessor to recover his losses. Doing so does not put
the adverse possessor in a worse position than before the transaction, it restores him to where
he was at that point. By selling land that does not belong to him, the adverse possessor
experienced a gain at the expense of the true owner. Now, equilibrium is restored: The true
owner has not lost his property, the buyer has regained what he lost in buying the property,
and the adverse possessor has neither gained nor lost anything, he is right where he started, a
trespasser who comes into the relationship with nothing and leaves with nothing as well.
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of ownership, which is a presumption that must be rebutted before the occupier is
asked to leave the property. Though the adverse possessor’s interest might be
personal rather than fungible, if he indeed bought the property or came to it in some
legitimate way, he will retain his personal rights. If, however, he came to the land
mistakenly or as a trespasser, chazakah looks at the morality of awarding ownership
over the property. If a trespasser, chazakah dictates that the adverse possessor lose
the property, if a rightful owner, chazakah requires his vindication.
Up to this point, it appears that chazakah would merely replace adverse
possession with a doctrine that is only slightly different, perhaps only by changing its
focus. Nonetheless, chazakah really provides much more than that. Not only does
chazakah maintain adverse possession’s justifications, but it also remedies adverse
possession’s shortcomings. Chazakah should be accepted because it provides an
institution that is less costly and fairer than adverse possession.
The most important feature of chazakah is that it evidences a transaction and
ownership; it is not the transaction itself. Chazakah, therefore, does not have the
necessary costs or fairness issues that plague adverse possession. Forcing adverse
possession to resemble chazakah, forces adverse possession to recognize bilateral
actions as effectuating transfer. This pushes adverse possession to fall in line with
all other methods of land transfer.
For a true owner to successfully defend against an adverse possession claim
under chazakah, he can attack the adverse possessor on two fronts. First, he can
attack the elements of adverse possession; by disproving any one of those elements,
the true owner retains ownership over his property.177 Alternatively, the true owner
could attack the claim of ownership itself. The true owner would be just as
successful in retaining ownership over his property by proving that the adverse
possessor never bought the land in the first place, as he would be by disproving any
of the elements of adverse possession. The result of this two-tiered system is that the
costs of adverse possession are reduced, if not completely removed.178 Were a true
owner permitted to retain ownership in light of an adverse possession claim by
merely proving that no transaction divesting him of his property occurred, he would
be less inclined to prevent others from using his otherwise unused portion of his
property. The costs that currently plague adverse possession would cease to exist in
the chazakah framework.
Unlike adverse possession, which views the adverse possessor as a trespasser
turned owner, chazakah views the adverse possessor as a true owner. A system that
rewards someone for buying property and using his possession as proof of such
purchase is far more palatable than a system that rewards a trespasser who just
177
This would work much the same way that the adverse possession doctrine currently
works.
178

Surely, the true owner who fears that he will be hauled into court in a suit to quiet title
could monitor his land, but he is no longer required to in order to prevail. In that case, the
owner who monitor’s his land does so voluntarily, rather than as a mechanism to keep his
property. He would be akin to the homeowner who installs a security system; he is not
required to do so to keep his home, but he does so to voluntarily protect his interests. The true
owner could, instead, keep good records of his ownership and the taxes he has paid on the
property. Should he be forced to defend himself in an action to quiet title, or litigate a trespass
suit against an adverse possession defense for that matter, he could provide his records of
ownership as proof of that no transaction took place.
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avoided being caught in time for the true owner to bring a claim. Under chazakah,
courts would be expected to weigh the adverse possessor’s claim that he bought the
land but lost the deed, against the true owner’s claim that no such sale took place.
Courts would look at the elements of adverse possession only as evidence that such a
transaction took place. If the adverse possessor proves the elements of adverse
possession, he gains a presumption of ownership to be rebutted by the true owner.
Clearly, this puts the true owner in a better position than under the current system of
adverse possession. Rather than simply losing his property because the adverse
possessor satisfactorily proves the elements, the true owner still has the ability to
retain ownership if he can prove that no sale took place. Ruling against the true
owner suggests that a transaction did take place. There is no question that if a
transaction took place, it is not unfair for the adverse possessor to be deemed the true
owner.
A system that is fairer for the true owner must be less fair for the adverse
possessor. Nonetheless, while the adverse possessor would be forced to do more
than just prove the elements of adverse possession, he would not be required to prove
his ownership. The rebuttable presumption of chazakah shifts the burden of proof to
the true owner to disprove the adverse possessor’s ownership. If, in fact, no
transaction occurred, the adverse possessor is no worse off than when he was a
trespasser. If, however, the true owner fails to prove that a transaction did not occur,
the adverse possessor is neither better nor worse off than under adverse possession.
Finally, if chazakah were to replace adverse possession, adverse possession
would resemble other land transfers. Unlike a doctrine that allows a transfer simply
based on the actions of one party, proving the elements of adverse possession in light
of chazakah proves that a bilateral transaction occurred. Where adverse possession
currently leaves us grasping for the other half of the transaction, chazakah provides
that other half. Viewing the elements of adverse possession as proof of a transaction,
assumes a bilateral transfer; it assumes that there was a “seller” or a “donor,” not just
a trespasser.
Where adverse possession fails, chazakah thrives. By taking the elements of
adverse possession and looking at them not as a means of acquiring ownership, but
rather as creating a presumption of ownership, chazakah provides an opportunity to
overhaul a system that is riddled with criticism. Chazakah takes the benefits of the
current adverse possession doctrine while simultaneously reducing the areas of
criticism. It is a system that values land ownership and the productive use of that
land. It does not, however, reward trespassers for being productive users. Under
chazakah, Robert Frost’s horseman should, as Frost suggested, continue on his
journey back to the village. His nephew will not inherit the forest, the horseman’s
productivity notwithstanding. The uncle never had a legitimate claim to the
property, so the nephew has no claim to the property.
Though adverse possession would likely reward the nephew for the toil of his
uncle, chazakah would do no such thing. Rather than simply looking at the facts on
the ground, i.e., who is on the property, who has been on the property, and how the
property has been used, chazakah attempts to get to the truth of the ownership
dilemma. It rewards property to rightful owners, those who have bought it, even if
they cannot prove it, rather than those who look at seemingly unused property as an
opportunity to enrich themselves, not caring who loses in the process. The horseman
had no rightful claim to the forest so his nephew has no claim to the forest. The
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children of the man in the village, though, do have a legitimate claim of ownership.
They are the rightful owners, and chazakah protects them.
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